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Constitutional Law.  State v. Roscoe, 198 A.3d 1232 (R.I. 2019). 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court vacated a conviction for murder 
and first degree sexual assault, holding that out-of-court 
testimonial statements of deceased declarants were introduced in 
violation of the defendant’s right to confront adverse witnesses, 
which is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and article I, section 10, of the Rhode Island 
Constitution.  
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
In August 1990, Germaine Mouchon (Mouchon), age eighty-
five, was discovered dead and unclothed in her West Warwick 
apartment.1  Detective Dennis Bousquet (Bousquet) of the West 
Warwick Police Department determined that there was no forced 
entry, and that the apartment was in “relative order,” except for an 
overturned end table and a woman’s slip lying on the floor.2  Upon 
reporting to the scene, medical examiner Francis Garrity, M.D. 
(Garrity) pronounced Mouchon deceased and performed a “cursory 
. . . examination of her body.”3  Later, at the medical examiner’s 
facility, Garrity identified injuries to Mouchon’s head and face.4  At 
that point, he swabbed Mouchon’s body for DNA.5  The swabs were 
preserved in a sealed evidence collection kit.6  During the autopsy, 
Garrity identified “indicators of a failing cardiovascular system,” 
leading him to declare the cause of death to be a “heart attack or a 
cardiac arrest following a traumatic event[,] namely multiple blunt 
force injuries about the face, left breast.”7  Initially, Garrity was 






7. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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unable to determine the manner of death.8  However, after learning 
that Mouchon’s swabs had tested positive for sperm, and further 
learning from Bousquet that Mouchon was not involved in a 
romantic relationship, Garrity found homicide to be the manner of 
death.9   
The case went cold for some twenty-five years, at which time 
Mouchon’s swabs were retested.10  The resulting DNA profile 
matched one David Roscoe, who was indicted on December 16, 2015 
for murder and first degree sexual assault, in violation of Rhode 
Island General Laws sections 11-23-1 and 11-37-2, respectively.11  
He was convicted by a jury on both counts and, after the trial justice 
denied his motion for new trial, he received two concurrent life 
sentences.12  
Subsequently, Roscoe appealed his conviction to the Rhode 
Island Supreme Court (the Court), arguing that the trial justice 
erred by: 
(1) failing to order a mistrial after the prosecutor made
improper remarks to the jury during his closing argument;
(2) allowing the medical examiner’s manner of death to be
presented to the jury; and (3) allowing statements of
deceased declarants to be admitted into evidence, in
violation of the Confrontation Clause of the United States
and the Rhode Island Constitutions.13
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
A. Prosecutor’s Remarks
The Court began by examining the prosecutor’s supposedly
“inappropriate, pungent, vulgar, and inaccurate remarks during 
8. Id. at 1235–36.




13. Id.  Roscoe also suggested that his convictions were violative of the
prohibition against double jeopardy, but the Court never considered this 
avenue of attack.  Id.  
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the course of his closing argument,”14 reviewing for clear error on 
the part of the trial justice.15  
Roscoe took issue with three comments in particular, which the 
Court considered in turn.16  First, the prosecutor had mentioned 
the rules of hearsay: specifically, he had stated that there were 
things he “couldn’t say” to the jury.17  Roscoe averred that this 
statement insinuated the existence of “incriminating or sinister 
facts,” thereby inducing “wild speculation by the jury.”18  The Court 
dismissed this contention, noting that the statements were not 
explicit summons to conjecture.19  Rather, the remarks were made 
clumsily during an attempt to elucidate sophisticated DNA 
science.20  The prosecutor’s language may have been artless, the 
Court admitted, but it discerned no clear error in the trial justice’s 
ruling that the utterances fell short of sowing prejudice in the 
jurors’ minds.21  
Second, Roscoe argued that the prosecutor had misled the jury 
by falsely attributing words to Garrity, the medical examiner.22  On 
redirect, the prosecutor had posed a hypothetical to Garrity as to 
how an individual with heart trouble might react to a violent attack 
on her person.23  Garrity had answered that such an individual’s 
life would be at risk; that she might “suffer[] a cardiac arrest as a 
result of the stress, the panic, and the pain.”24  However, in his 
closing, the prosecutor neglected the hypothetical context of 
Garrity’s answer, asserting that the medical examiner had stated 
that “the pain, the panic, the anxiety of the sexual assault pushed 
this woman over the edge.”25  However, the Court concluded that 
the trial justice was correct in determining that the prosecutor’s 
statement did not constitute “blatant misrepresentation,” but 
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1237 (quoting State v. Dubois, 36 A.3d 191, 197 (R.I. 2012)).
16. See id. at 1237–40.
17. Id. at 1236.
18. Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Bolden, 323 A.2d 797, 799 (Pa. Super.
1974)).  
19. See id. at 1238.
20. Id. at 1237–38.




25. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added).
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rather “a fair inference” from Garrity’s testimony.26  The Court also 
noted that the trial justice had provided adequate “cautionary 
instruction” concerning the non-evidentiary nature of the 
prosecutor’s words.27  
Third, Roscoe objected to the prosecutor’s accusation that the 
defense had labeled Mouchon a “slut” and “whore.”28  Roscoe 
maintained that his counsel had said no such thing, but had merely 
suggested that it was not beyond the realm of possibility that the 
victim and defendant enjoyed voluntary intercourse, despite their 
great age difference.29  The Court condemned the prosecutor’s 
“coarse and vulgar verbiage” as “unacceptable,” and affirmed that 
his remarks were “untethered to the record.”30  Yet the Court also 
acknowledged that it had previously held that such inappropriate 
remarks are not always grounds for vacating a conviction, finding 
that they sometimes amount to little more than “harmless error . . . 
in the face of ‘overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt’ and 
adequate cautionary instructions.”31  Ultimately, the Court 
refrained from deciding whether the comments were so egregious 
as to necessitate that Roscoe’s conviction be vacated, since it 
reached the same conclusion on different grounds.32   
B. Medical Examiner’s Testimony
The Court next considered Roscoe’s argument that Garrity’s
testimony concerning the manner of Mouchon’s death had been 
wrongly admitted into evidence.  Specifically, Roscoe asserted that 
the testimony of a medical examiner should not rely on “anecdotal 
history and the results of the police investigation.”33  In essence, 
Roscoe argued that Garrity’s pronouncement of homicide hinged on 
his knowledge that sperm had been found in Mouchon’s body, 
combined with witness statements that she had not been engaged 
in a romantic relationship.34  In other words, Garrity, though 
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1239.
28. See id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1239–40.
31. Id. at 1240 (quoting State v. Simpson, 658 A.2d 522, 528 (R.I. 1995)).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See id. at 1241.
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offered as a medical expert, testified based on facts extraneous to 
his technical and scientific expertise.35   
However, the Court concluded for two reasons that the trial 
justice had not erred: first, it was understandable for the medical 
examiner to account for the decedent’s personal history; second, 
Garrity had not relied “solely or primarily” on witness testimony.36  
Drawing on the jurisprudence of other states,37 the Court declared 
that it is permissible for medical examiners to “supplement their 
medical findings with other information . . . so long as they do not 
rely solely or primarily on such information.”38  
C. Violations of the Confrontation Clause
Finally, the Court took up Roscoe’s claim that his right to
confront adverse witnesses had been violated by Bousquet’s 
testimony that he had asked Mouchon’s friends and family about 
her romantic status, which testimony was also referenced by the 
prosecutor in closing.39  The right to confront adverse witnesses is 
enshrined in the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and article I, section 10, of the Rhode Island 
Constitution.40  Because of the constitutional character of this 
claim, the Court reviewed the trial justice’s ruling de novo.41  
Additionally, the Court applied harmless-error analysis.42  
The Court noted that sexual intercourse had very likely 
occurred between Roscoe and Mouchon, considering that the 
35. See id. at 1240–41.
36. Id. at 1241.
37. In particular, the Court leaned on South Carolina v. Commander, 721
S.E.2d 413 (S.C. 2011). 
38. Roscoe, 198 A.3d at 1243.  The Court thus distinguished Roscoe from
State v. Castore, 435 A.2d 321 (R.I. 1981), where a physician made a 
determination of child abuse based solely on anecdotal history as related by the 
patient-complainant.  See id. at 1241-42. 
39. Id. at 1244–45.  The witnesses had died in the intervening years.  Id.
at 1245.  As for Bousquet, he was retired when the trial took place. Id. at 1244, 
n.8.
40. Id. at 1244.
41. Id. (quoting State v. Moten, 64 A.3d 1232, 1238 (R.I. 2013)).
42. Id. at 1245 (citing State v. Albanese, 970 A.2d 1215, 1222 (R.I. 2009)).
In essence, the Court asked: even if “the damaging potential of . . . cross-
examination were fully realized,” was the error still “harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt?” Id. (quoting Albanese, 970 A.2d at 1222). 
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former’s sperm was recovered from the latter’s person.43  The major 
question was whether this intercourse had been consensual.44  On 
direct, Bousquet testified that he had asked three individuals close 
to Mouchon about her relationship status, although the detective 
did not relay these individuals’ responses.45  In his closing 
argument, the prosecutor referenced Bousquet’s testimony, adding: 
“Don’t you think [the police] would have followed up?”46  
The Court concluded that the statements of the three 
unavailable witnesses offered by way of Bousquet were 
“testimonial,” that is, they were meant to “establish or prove past 
events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.”47  
Although Bousquet did not expressly convey the words of the three 
witnesses, “the jury was left with the unavoidable implication that 
each of these individuals had told the police they did not believe 
Mrs. Mouchon was in a relationship.”48  This impression was 
“reinforced” in the prosecutor’s closing argument.49  The 
Confrontation Clause pertains where, as here, the jury can surmise 
the “contents of untested out-of-court testimonial statements.”50  
The State argued in response that, even if the jury gleaned the 
contents of the unavailable witnesses’s statements from Bousquet’s 
testimony, Roscoe was not “directly implicate[d]” thereby.51  After 
all, even if the jury gathered that Mouchon was not in a relationship 
with Roscoe, there was no need to conclude on that basis that 
Roscoe sexually assaulted Mouchon.52  The Court was not 
convinced, noting that the statements of the unavailable witnesses 
were offered to prove Roscoe’s guilt.53  Therefore, the Court found 





47. Id. at 1246 (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006))
(internal quotations omitted). 
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. (citing United States v. Meises, 645 F.3d 5, 21 (1st Cir. 2011);
United States v. Kizee, 877 F.3d 650, 657 (5th Cir. 1972)). 
51. Id. at 1247.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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Bousquet’s testimony, the testimony of the three unavailable 
witnesses, whom the defendant was unable to confront.54  
Lastly, the Court determined that the trial justice’s error was 
not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.55  Given the State’s 
burden to prove the nonconsensual nature of the sexual contact 
between Mouchon and Roscoe—and given the absence of defensive 
hand wounds, vaginal injuries, and signs of forced entry—much 
hinged on whether a romantic relationship existed between victim 
and defendant.56  Since evidence of that relationship turned on the 
testimonial statements of the unavailable witnesses, the Court 
could not conclude that, had the witnesses between cross-examined, 
no reasonable jury would have acquitted.57  
D. Holding and Concurrences
The Court held that the “introduction of out-of-court
statements of deceased declarants” violated Roscoe’s right to 
confront adverse witnesses under the Sixth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and article I, section 10, of the Rhode 
Island Constitution.58  Thus, the Court vacated his conviction and 
ordered a new trial.59  
Chief Justice Suttell concurred, adding that the trial justice 
abused his discretion by failing to grant a mistrial because of the 
prosecutor’s accusation that the defense had called Mouchon a 
“slut” and “whore.”60  Such remarks were not only “inflammatory,” 
but also “false.”61  Justice Robinson also concurred, reckoning that 
reversal could be granted based on the “very inappropriate 





57. See id. (quoting State v. Albanese, 970 A.2d 1215, 1222 (R.I. 2009)).
58. Id. at 1248.
59. Id.
60. Id. (Suttell, J., concurring).
61. Id.
62. Id. (Robinson, J., concurrng).
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COMMENTARY 
The Court’s opinion is persuasive on all points save the 
prosecutor’s hearsay remarks. The Court acknowledged that 
hearsay references are egregious because they suggest ominous and 
incriminatory facts, thereby tempting jurors’ imaginations to run 
amok.63  However, in the instant case, the Court excused such 
insinuations, finding their danger mitigated by their context.64  Yet 
poison is poison whether drunk from chalice or mug.  The 
prosecutor intimated hidden evidence; he thereby invited 
conjecture.  Although “the ruling of the trial justice  . . . [should] not 
be disturbed on appeal unless clearly wrong,”65 the trial justice here 
admitted that the “‘[c]ourt’s ears went up’ at the mention of 
hearsay.”66  Arguably, this reflex indicated recognition of a serious 
transgression by the prosecutor.  Given the prosecutor’s other 
blameworthy behavior, the Court could reasonably have 
interpreted his hearsay allusions as calculated encouragements to 
the jury to traffic in fantasy rather than fact.  The Court’s ruling on 
this matter may ultimately be correct.  However, at very least, its 
analysis evinces a surprising insensitivity to the peril to justice 
occasioned by the prosecutor’s remarks.  It is axiomatic that a 
defendant in a criminal case should have fair opportunity to 
confront evidence offered against him.  Allusions to unseen, 
unspecified evidence make mockery of due process by raising the 
specter of damning facts that the defendant cannot firmly grasp 
and squarely challenge.   
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the prosecutor’s use 
of out-of-court testimonial statements of deceased declarants 
violated the defendant’s right to confront adverse witnesses, as 
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and article I, section 10, of the Rhode Island 
Constitution.  The Court therefore vacated the defendant’s 
63. See id. at 1237 (majority opinion).
64. Id. at 1238.
65. Id. (citing State v. Dubois, 36 A.3d 191, 197 (R.I. 2012)).
66. Id.
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conviction for murder and first degree sexual assault and ordered a 
new trial.  
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